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What’s Law Good For? An
Empirical Overview of Charter
Equality Rights Decisions
Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C. Faria and Emily Lawrence∗

“…the [similarly situated] test cannot be accepted as a fixed rule or
formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the Charter.”
-McIntyre J. in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia1

It has now been 15 years since the Supreme Court first outlined, in
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, an approach to the interpretation of the equality rights in section 15 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,2 and five years since the Court revised the test for determining violations of section 15 in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration).3 It has become a cliché to note that the definition of
equality rights is the most challenging and elusive task imposed on the
judiciary by the Charter. Equality has long been the subject of ideologically charged debates featuring widely divergent theories. Since philosophers have debated the meaning of equality for millennia, it should
hardly be surprising that the Canadian courts have had difficulty settling
on a single approach to equality rights since they came into force in
1985 — or if the generality of the approaches on which they have
agreed can serve to obscure fundamental differences.
∗
Bruce Ryder, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Cidalia C. Faria, Assistant Crown Attorney, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario, and
LL.M. in Constitutional Law 2001, Osgoode Hall Law School; Emily Lawrence, LL.B.
student, Class of 2005, Osgoode Hall Law School. The views expressed here are the authors’
and not those of the Ministry of the Attorney General.
1
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 168, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 6.
2
Being Schedule I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act,
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12.
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The potential breadth of equality rights raises the interpretive stakes
compared to the more focused application of most other Charter rights
and freedoms. In a society characterized by persistent inequalities, the
judiciary could enlist section 15 in the redistribution of a wide range of
legal and material entitlements. Section 15 thus implicates, in a particularly profound manner, the appropriate division of responsibility between courts and legislatures in a constitutional democracy. Perhaps this
helps explain both the courts’ cautious approach to the adjudication of
equality claims and the intemperate nature of much of the academic
commentary on their equality decisions — high expectations or political
anxieties meet judicial realpolitik. We should approach the task of seeking section 15’s meanings with a humility that befits the size of the
challenge. As the Supreme Court has noted, there are no fixed or easy
formulas to the definition of equality.
This paper begins, in Part I, by outlining the tension between formal
and substantive understandings of equality that characterizes section 15
jurisprudence. While both visions have informed the interpretation of
section 15, and often work harmoniously in resolving equality issues,
we are concerned that the Court has not consistently adhered to its stated
commitment to favouring substantive equality over formal equality
when the two visions clash. In Part II, we review academic assessments
of the Supreme Court’s approach to section 15 and its record in equality
rights litigation. While some of the commentators share our concern that
the Court’s recent jurisprudence is compromising its commitment to
substantive equality, others express the view that the Court has consistently favoured the claims and perspectives of equality-seeking groups.
In Part III, we attempt to shed some light on these varying assessments
by examining the record of Supreme Court and lower court decisions in
adjudicating section 15 claims over the past 15 years. We found that the
success rate of equality claimants has been consistently and significantly
lower than the success rate of Charter claimants generally, although the
success rate has increased in the past five years. In Part IV, we examine
how the Supreme Court has applied the four contextual factors set out in
Law to guide the determination of whether differences in treatment on
prohibited grounds violate human dignity and thus amount to discrimination in a substantive sense. Of these four factors, we found that the
“correspondence” factor, which restates the similarly situated test rejected as a guide to section 15 in Andrews, has functioned as the determinative factor in the Court’s equality decisions since Law. Finally, in
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Part V, we discuss the need to reconsider the application of the four
contextual factors in Law so that the promotion of substantive equality
is consistently treated as the primary goal of equality jurisprudence. We
argue that violations of section 15 should be found whenever governments impose differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground
that has the effect of further subordinating an already disadvantaged
group, unless the law or policy at issue is a targeted program that ameliorates the condition of a more or equally disadvantaged group.

I. THE TENSION BETWEEN FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
UNDERSTANDINGS OF EQUALITY
In resolving the challenges posed by section 15 of the Charter, the
courts have drawn significant guidance from anti-discrimination jurisprudence developed under Canadian human rights statutes, from the
experience of other nations and from international law. Relying on these
sources and the text of section 15, the courts have concluded that section
15 does not posit a general guarantee of legal equality that can be used
to challenge any legal differences in treatment. Section 15 is concerned,
rather, only with those legal inequalities imposed on the basis of the
most pernicious and persistent disadvantages associated with the personal characteristics listed as prohibited grounds of discrimination (or
analogous thereto). In addition, the courts have had no difficulty concluding that section 15 is concerned with discrimination that can be
either intentional or inadvertent, direct (resulting from a classification
on a prohibited ground that is evident on the face of a law or policy) or
indirect (resulting from the effects of the application of a facially-neutral
law or policy). Nevertheless, fundamental differences about the meaning
of equality rights permeate the Canadian constitutional jurisprudence,
sometimes emerging in the open articulation of different legal rules,
more often emerging in divergent applications of the same legal rules.
At the risk of over-simplifying the complexity of the issues, we
suggest that one tension in particular has always dominated, and continues to dominate, the jurisprudence: the tension between formal and
substantive understandings of equality. While these terms are often used
in very different ways by different commentators, we believe they continue to have analytical salience.
We understand formal equality to be concerned with ensuring that
laws or policies do not impose disadvantages on individuals by treating
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them according to false stereotypes associated with irrelevant personal
characteristics. The focus of formal equality is on the individual’s situation, and on the relevance of the personal characteristics at issue to the
objectives of the challenged law or policy. The “similarly situated” test,
which measures means-ends rationality (or the fit between a challenged
difference in treatment and the objectives of a law), is the most familiar
expression of this understanding of formal equality. In contrast, we
understand substantive equality to be concerned with ensuring that laws
or policies do not impose subordinating treatment on groups already
suffering social, political or economic disadvantage in Canadian society.
The focus of substantive equality is on the group, and on the impact of
the law on its social, economic or political conditions. Thus, for example, in the debate about whether the opposite-sex requirement in the
legal definition of marriage violates section 15, formal equality focuses
on whether sexual orientation is relevant to the objectives of the legal
definition of marriage; substantive equality focuses on whether the exclusion from marriage has the effect of further subordinating gays and
lesbians in Canadian society.
It is sometimes remarked that Charter equality jurisprudence has rejected formal equality in favour of a substantive understanding of equality. As we understand them, however, both understandings of equality
permeate the jurisprudence. The tests developed by the Supreme Court
in Andrews and Law to guide the interpretation of section 15 can be seen
as attempts to mediate the tension between them. The Court in Andrews
stated that the similarly situated test should be rejected “as a fixed rule
or formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the
Charter”.4 Nevertheless, a focus on means-ends rationality, or on determining whether a law is treating individuals according to relevant personal characteristics, remained central to the definition of discrimination
put forward by McIntyre J. in Andrews.5 In other decisions, the Court

4

Supra, note 1.
For example, McIntyre J. wrote that “[d]istinctions based on personal characteristics
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape
the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities will
rarely be so classed”. Andrews, supra, note 1, at 174-75. A key issue arising from this deceptively simple formulation is how to determine when distinctions based on personal characteristics reflect relevant merits and capacities as opposed to the stereotypical application of
group characteristics.
5
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has emphasized that overcoming group-based disadvantage is the dominant purpose of section 15.6 It is fair to say, then, that section 15 has two
purposes: ensuring that laws avoid treating individuals according to
irrelevant personal characteristics, and ensuring that laws avoid further
subordination of already disadvantaged groups.7 Section 15(1), with its
focus on the equality rights of individuals, and section 15(2), with its
focus on overcoming group-based disadvantage, reflect these twin purposes.
In many cases, formal and substantive understandings of equality
will work together to lead to the same conclusion — because neither
understanding of equality is violated, or both are. The latter kind of
alignment is apparent, for example, in the challenges to the opposite-sex
requirement of the legal definition of marriage. The exclusion treats
individuals irrationally since sexual orientation does not relate to the
objectives of contemporary marriage law. The exclusion also has the
effect of further subordinating an already disadvantaged group.
On some occasions, a law or policy may violate formal equality, but
not implicate substantive equality because it does not further subordinate, or ameliorate the conditions of an already disadvantaged group. In
these circumstances, the courts have held that a violation of formal
equality is sufficient to breach section 15(1). An equality claimant need
not be a member of a disadvantaged group. This strikes us as a sensible
conclusion, one that accords with the listing in section 15(1) of grounds
of discrimination (e.g., sex) rather than disadvantaged groups (e.g.,
women). There is no problem with giving effect to formal equality per
se; the problem is that formal equality, as the Court has recognized, and
as section 15(2) underlines, is an incomplete understanding of equality.
The tensions in the jurisprudence between formal and substantive
understandings of equality come to the fore when they are not aligned in
a particular case. This can happen in a number of ways.
First, conflict can arise when a law violates formal equality and simultaneously promotes substantive equality by improving the conditions of a disadvantaged group, as is often the case with affirmative

6
E.g., R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1333 (Justice Wilson described the purpose of s. 15 as “remedying or preventing discrimination against groups
suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society”).
7
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 624, at para. 54.
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action programs. In these instances, section 15(2) indicates that substantive equality trumps formal inequality. The Court’s decisions in Law
and Lovelace8 give expression to just such a priority of substantive over
formal equality. They indicate that targeted ameliorative programs
aimed at improving the conditions of disadvantaged groups will rarely
violate section 15.
A second kind of conflict, and the least openly addressed in the jurisprudence to date, arises when a law is consistent with formal equality
yet violates substantive equality. This occurs when a law meets the
similarly situated test — because the personal characteristic at issue is
rationally related to the objectives of the challenged law — but has the
effect of further subordinating an already disadvantaged group. How
should courts resolve section 15 issues when consistence with formal
equality clashes with the promotion of substantive inequality? The tension here is the reverse of the one arising with affirmative action programs. Yet the preference for substantive equality expressed in the text
of section 15(2) should also point to the result here: just as the promotion of substantive equality should not be inhibited by formal equality,
the exacerbation of substantive inequality should not be excused by
formal equality. Targeted affirmative action programs do not normally
violate section 15 because the promotion of substantive equality justifies
the violation of formal equality. Similarly, a law that exacerbates substantive inequality should violate section 15 even if it is consistent with
formal equality. As we will see in our review of recent Supreme Court
decisions in Part IV below, the opposite appears to be occurring: outside
the affirmative action context, formal equality appears to be prevailing
over substantive equality. As we will see in the next section, this is a
concern shared by other commentators.

II. CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
SECTION 15 DECISIONS
While the approach to section 15 set out in Andrews received, and
continues to receive, a welcome reception in the academic literature, the
Law ruling has generated a largely negative response. For example,

8

Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36.
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Christopher Bredt and Adam Dodek have expressed the concern that the
human dignity standard introduced in Law is “hopelessly abstract”, and
places too great a burden on equality claimants by shifting to section 15
a balancing of individual rights and social objectives that ought to take
place pursuant to section 1, where the government rather than the claimant has the burden of proof.9 Similarly, Peter Hogg has argued that the
“human dignity” test articulated in Law is “vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants”.10 He, like Bredt and Dodek, has urged a
return to the simpler and more predictable test set out by the Court in
Andrews.11
Others have recognized that once we accept, as the Court did in Andrews, that not all burdensome differences in treatment on the basis of
prohibited grounds are discriminatory, a third step to the section 15
inquiry is necessary to sort out discriminatory from non-discriminatory
differences in treatment.12 However, a number of scholars have raised
the alarm that the “relevancy” test favoured by a minority of the Court
in the 1995 trilogy13 was not explicitly put to rest in the Law ruling.
Sheilah Martin has argued that the question of whether differential
treatment is relevant to a law’s objectives needs to be banished more
clearly from section 15:
While discrimination may sometimes involve an irrelevant personal
characteristic it should not be elevated into a mandatory requirement….
[Relevancy] made discrimination into a fit between means and ends,

9

C. Bredt and A. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for
Section 15” (2003) 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 33, at 47. See also C. Bredt & I. Nishisato, “The
Supreme Court’s New Equality Test: A Critique” (September-October 2000) 8 Canada Watch
16.
10
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2003, student
ed.), at 1080.
11
Id., at 1081. For other critiques of the indeterminancy of the human dignity standard,
see S. Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar
Rev. 299, 329-32; J. Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11 Const. Forum 74; D.
Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001)
13 C.J.W.L. 37, at 56: “Human dignity is a concept that is malleable enough that it can mean
whatever the judges want it to mean”.
12
E.g., D. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63 Louisiana L. Rev. 645; D.
Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299; D.
Greschner, “The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6 Review of Constitutional
Studies 290.
13
See the opinions of La Forest J. in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, [1995]
S.C.J. No. 43 and Gonthier J. in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44.
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without subjecting the ends to sufficient scrutiny or gauging the law’s
social underpinnings or impacts and without calling on the government to
justify its actions.14

While in her view an assessment of the fit between means and ends
is a necessary element of the Charter analysis, Martin argues that it is
preferable to have the government bear the burden of addressing the
issue pursuant to section 1.15
Dianne Pothier’s review of the Court’s first decisions applying the
Law test echoed Martin’s concern that the scope of section 15 is being
unjustly restricted by the centrality placed on relevance in the human
dignity analysis.16 Similarly, Donna Greschner has urged the Court to
reject the “discredited ‘relevancy’ test” on the grounds that it “is formalistic and undermines a substantive approach to equality”.17 Diana Majury
likewise expresses the concern that some of the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions “raise the spectre that the Court is slipping backward in its understanding and commitment to substantive equality”.18
Another group of more intemperate critics paint a very different picture of the Court’s Charter jurisprudence. Rather than finding signs of a
compromised commitment to substantive equality, they accuse the
Court of being captured by the claims of equality-seeking groups and
their powerful allies in government, academia and the legal profession.
Thus, for example, F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff have suggested that
“the Court Party”, a coalition of social interests that includes equalityseeking groups like LEAF and EGALE, has hijacked the Court by persuading it to adopt a “revolutionary human rights understanding of the
Charter’s equality provisions”.19 Similarly, Robert Martin argues that
the Court has embraced a “dominant orthodoxy” shaped in large part by
interest group and identity politics around issues of sex, ethnicity and

14

Supra, note 11, at 327.
Id., at 362.
16
D. Pothier, supra, note 11, at 56.
17
D. Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?”, supra, note 12, at 301.
18
D. Majury, “The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 297, at 306.
19
F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), at 68.
15
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sexual orientation.20 Martin is particularly troubled, and at his most
polemical, regarding what he sees as “feminist domination of the legal
and political processes in Canada”.21 He notes that feminist and other
groups seeking social justice have focused on section 15 of the Charter,
and “their preference for section 15 has resonated with the judges of the
Supreme Court and, as a result, the section gives every sign of eclipsing
the rest of the Charter”.22 He suggests that “[t]he dominant orthodoxy
has become the primary factor that determines the outcome of litigation
before the [Supreme] Court”.23
Does the Court’s record in section 15 cases support the claims of the
critics that the Court is backing away from its commitment to substantive equality, or, conversely, that it is captured by the aspirations and
theories of equality-seeking groups? Back in 1989, just prior to the
release of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Andrews, Gwen Brodsky and
Shelagh Day published an empirical analysis of section 15 cases that
demonstrated that a disproportionate number of equality rights claims
were being brought by members of non-disadvantaged groups and that
an alarmingly small number of claims had been raised by individuals or
groups identified by certain prohibited grounds of discrimination.24 No
doubt the Andrews decision altered that trend by confining equality
claims to challenges to differential treatment on the basis of enumerated
or analogous grounds. However, since Brodsky and Day’s study, there
has been little in the way of empirical examinations attempting to measure in quantitative terms the relative success rate of section 15 claims.
We have attempted to rectify that situation, at least in part, by undertaking a quantitative examination of the courts’ disposition of section 15
claims since the 1989 ruling in Andrews to determine whether the record
supports the kinds of concerns raised by the critics described above.

20

R.I. Martin, The Most Dangerous Branch: How the Supreme Court Has Undermined
Our Law and Our Democracy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2003).
21
Id., at 24. See also id., at 124 “Feminist thought and ideology are central elements of
the ruling orthodoxy”.
22
Id., at 21.
23
Id., at 35.
24
G. Brodsky and S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: CACSW, 1989).
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III. SUCCESS RATES OF SECTION 15 CLAIMS
Tabulated in Appendix A are the 43 decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada in which a majority of the Court ruled on a section 15 claim,
beginning with Andrews and ending with its most recent equality rights
ruling in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v.
Canada.25 We have also compiled a sample of lower court section 15
rulings during the decade that Andrews was the leading case (February
2, 1989 to March 25, 1999) and during the five years since Law was
decided (March 25, 1999). The sample includes all lower court decisions disposing of section 15 claims that were reported in the Dominion
Law Reports, the Federal Court Reports, or that are available in QuickLaw’s federal court judgments database or provincial judgments databases for the prairie and Atlantic provinces.26 This yielded a database of
323 lower court rulings.27 We then classified the Supreme Court and
lower court rulings on the basis of whether or not the court found a
violation of the Charter in its disposition of the section 15 claim. This
analysis yielded the following data on success rates:
SCC
Lower courts

Under Andrews
25.9%
7/27
18.9%
43/228

Under Law
31.2%
5/16
26.3%
25/95

Total
27.9%
12/43
21.1%
68/323

The success rate of section 15 claims at the Supreme Court, 27.9 per
cent, is significantly lower than the average success rate of all Charter
claims before the Court, which, according to Patrick Monahan and Nadine Blum, hovered around 35 per cent from 1991-2002,28 or a slightly
lower rate (33 or 34 per cent) according to studies by F.L. Morton et al.
and James Kelly covering the periods from 1982-1992 and 1993-1997

25

[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6.
Our sample does not yet include decisions reported in QuickLaw’s Ontario, Quebec
or British Columbia provincial judgments databases.
27
The full list of lower court decisions included in the sample reported here is available
from the authors.
28
P. J. Monahan and N. Blum, “Constitutional Cases 2002: An Overview” (2003) 20
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 3, at 6-7.
26
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respectively.29 The success rate of section 15 claims at the lower courts
is substantially lower (21.1 per cent) than at the Supreme Court (27.9
per cent) over the 15-year period since 1989. This is not surprising since
the Supreme Court’s position as the final court of appeal, together with
its ability to control its docket, means that the equality claims it adjudicates will be drawn largely from the pool of more credible claims presented in the lower courts. Another notable feature of the data is that the
success rate of section 15 claims at both the Supreme Court and lower
courts has increased since the Law ruling compared to the Andrews
decade.
Of course, there are a number of reasons to be cautious before drawing conclusions from this data. The “success” or “failure” of a section
15 claim is not necessarily a reliable indicator of a court’s commitment
to upholding equality rights. Not all section 15 claims rely on a desirable or even plausible interpretation of equality rights. Thus, for example, when Imre Finta’s equality rights challenge to the war criminal
provisions of the Criminal Code failed,30 few would consider its dismissal as anything but a victory for our understandings of equality. Yet
it is counted here as a “failed” section 15 claim. Other unsuccessful
claims are counted as “failed” even though they may articulate a vision
of substantive equality that will assist disadvantaged groups in political
and legal struggles.31 Conversely, some “successful” claims may articulate narrow or regressive conceptions of equality. Clearly, then, the
quantitative summary we are presenting here is a crude measure of
“success” in equality litigation. It needs to be supplemented by a variety
of other kinds of studies to get a full picture of the results and the impact
of equality litigation. Quantitative analysis needs to be supplemented by
the traditional kinds of qualitative analysis that critically evaluate the

29

F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992” (1994) 5 N.J.C.L. 1; J. Kelly,
“The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in
Canada, 1982-1997” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625. In their analysis of the Court’s first
195 Charter decisions, Morton et al. found that the Charter claimant succeeded in 33 per cent
of the cases. Kelly added to the Morton et al. study an analysis of the Court’s 157 Charter
rulings between 1993-1997, and found the Charter claimant succeeded 34 per cent of the time
from 1982-1997.
30
R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26.
31
E.g., Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872, [1993] S.C.J.
No. 81.
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substance of equality decisions.32 We also need more investigation of
the impact of legal decisions on political actors and policy development,33 and, perhaps most importantly, we need more inquiries into how
and in what ways policy changes generated by equality litigation are
actually having an impact on the lives of equality litigants and the
groups they represent. Quantitative analysis of cases only offers a
glimpse of overall trends in courts’ decision-making — it cannot in
itself provide explanations for those trends or reveal anything useful
about the impact of equality litigation on government policy or people’s
lives.
Bearing in mind these caveats, what can our data tell us about the
courts’ handling of Charter equality claims? The increased success rate
of section 15 claims since Law casts some doubt on the thesis that the
Law test places greater burdens on equality claimants than the Andrews
ruling did. The Andrews opinion posited an apparently straightforward
definition of discrimination: differences in treatment on prohibited
grounds based on prescribed group characteristics would normally be
discriminatory, while differences in treatment on prohibited grounds
that reflected actual merits and capacities would rarely be discriminatory. The Law test is an attempt to work out the complexities buried in
this deceptively simple formulation. As Denise Réaume has noted, the
human dignity approach to discrimination “may be less a new threshold
requirement of section 15 than a matter of making explicit a condition
already present”.34
The increased success rate in the past five years is likely attributable, at least in part, to factors other than the doctrinal differences between Andrews and Law. It seems likely, for example, that potential
litigants and their legal advisors have become more sophisticated in
predicting which cases are likely to succeed and more wary of launching
equality challenges as the evidentiary and doctrinal hurdles they face

32

We attempt to join these two types of analysis in Part IV, below.
Commendable examples include Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What Is Parliament’s Role? (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); C. Manfredi,
Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: Legal Mobilization and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); F.L. Morton and A. Allen, “Feminists
and the Courts: Measuring Success in Interest Group Litigation in Canada” (2001) 34 Can. J.
Pol. Sci. 55.
34
D. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity”, supra, note 12, at 654.
33
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have become better understood. It may also be that the resources available to equality-seeking groups to fund litigation have declined and that
this has led to a concentration of effort on equality litigation with relatively high chances of success. We found some support for these hypotheses by tracking the annual success rate at the lower courts to see
how it varied over the fifteen-year period. We found a success rate of
15.6 per cent at the lower courts in the first five years after Andrews
(1989-1993: 21/128), followed by an increase to 24.5 per cent in the
second half of the Andrews decade (1994-1998: 23/94), a rate that has
increased slightly to 26.3 per cent since the Law ruling (25/95). While
the number of Supreme Court decisions is much smaller, the data also
indicates an increased success rate since the mid-1990s (see Appendices
A and B, below).
Overall, the data suggests that the success rate of section 15 claims
has been relatively low, compared to Charter claims generally, throughout the Andrews decade and the first five years under Law. The data
does not support the view that the Andrews test operated in a manner
more supportive of equality claimants. Nor does it support the view that
the courts have been particularly receptive to the claims of equalityseeking groups. For example, examining the record of Supreme Court
decisions, it is striking that six of the nine grounds of discrimination
listed in section 15 have not given rise to a single successful claim (race,
national origin, ethnic origin, colour, religion, mental disability). Since
there have been either no claims considered by the Court, or very few,
on each of these grounds, this is a reminder that the costs of litigation
remain the most formidable barrier to the affirmation and protection of
equality rights.
Moreover, the success rate at the Supreme Court of claims based on
a number of the enumerated grounds is low. For example, the success
rate of claims based on age discrimination is 20 per cent (1/5). The
success rate of claims based on sex discrimination is 25 per cent (2/8),
and in the two successful cases, the claimants were men. This is not the
record of a Court captured by the interests and ideologies of equalityseeking groups.
Criticisms that the Law test has made it harder to assert a successful
section 15 claim have focused on its approach to the third stage of the
section 15 analysis, namely, its definition of discrimination as a violation of human dignity, to be assessed by reference to four contextual
factors from the point of view of a reasonable person in the claimant’s
position. The critics have raised concerns that this third stage of the
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equality analysis, following on the establishment of differential treatment (1st stage) on the basis of a prohibited ground (2nd stage), places
onerous burdens on equality claimants. To attempt to measure whether
the record of decision-making lends credence to this concern, we have
categorized the cases where section 15 claims failed according to the
stage of the analysis at which they foundered. The results are as follows:
Stage of analysis at which unsuccessful section 15 claims failed35
1 = differential treatment
2 = prohibited ground
3 = discrimination
s. 1 = s. 15 violation upheld pursuant to s. 1

SCC
Lower
courts

Under Andrews — failure at which stage

Under Law — failure at which stage

1
18.75%
3/16
26.6%
47/177

1
0%
0/11
37.7%
26/69

2
37.5%
6/16
53.1%
94/177

3
25%
4/16
15.8%
28/177

s. 1
18.75%
3/16
4.5%
8/177

2
27.3%
3/11
33.3%
23/69

3
63.6%
7/11
14.5%
14/69

s. 1
9.1%
1/11
8.7%
6/69

As one would expect, the data reveals that a larger proportion of
equality claims were dismissed at the prohibited grounds stage of analysis during the Andrews decade than has been the case in the last five
years. As different personal characteristics are rejected or accepted as
analogous grounds, it is predictable that the number of claims dismissed
at this stage would diminish.
The Supreme Court data supports the view that the human dignity
stage of the Law analysis has posed a formidable barrier to equality
claimants, accounting for the dismissal of the claim in almost two-thirds
(7/11) of the unsuccessful section 15 cases in the past five years. This is
a significant increase from the Court’s record during the Andrews decade, when more claims were dismissed at the first two stages of the
equality analysis or by upholding violations of section 15 pursuant to
section 1. This change in the pattern of Supreme Court decision-making
35

The cases tabulated here do not include all failed s. 15 claims in our sample. Omitted from the tabulation are claims that failed on the grounds that the claimant could not
invoke s. 15 (e.g., on the grounds that corporations cannot claim s. 15 rights).
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supports the concern expressed by a number of commentators that the
Law test has shifted the burden of analysis from section 1 to the human
dignity stage of the section 15 test.36 On the other hand, the pattern of
lower court decisions is very different. After Law, more than two-thirds
of the section 15 claims rejected by the lower courts fail at the first two
stages of the equality analysis, as they did in the Andrews decade. The
number of claims failing at the third stage of the analysis has decreased
since Law. Compared to the record during the Andrews decade, the
number of equality violations that lower courts have found to be justified pursuant to section 1 has increased.
Members of the Supreme Court have suggested on a number of occasions that it will be rare that discrimination will not also be established if the claimant has succeeded in demonstrating differential
treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground.37 At the Supreme Court
level, this prognostication has proven to be dramatically inaccurate. The
Court has regularly found differential treatment on a prohibited ground
to be non-discriminatory. It has done so in seven of the 16 cases where
the Court applied the Law test to resolve a section 15 claim. The strikingly different pattern at the lower courts reminds us that the Supreme
Court data reflects a skewed selection of section 15 cases as a whole,
one that likely overemphasizes the dispositive role, in practice, of the
human dignity stage of the Law test.
The section 15 cases to which the Supreme Court gives leave are
more likely to be well-presented and well-funded claims that involve the
most challenging aspects of equality litigation, and thus are more likely to
turn on the Court’s conclusion at the human dignity stage. At the lower
courts, the vast majority (71 per cent) of unsuccessful equality claims
since Law have failed at either the differential treatment or prohibited
ground stages of analysis, while 14.5 per cent have failed at the human
dignity stage of the Law test. Interestingly, a comparable proportion (15.8
per cent) of section 15 claims failed at the discrimination stage in the
lower courts during the Andrews decade. Establishing differences in
treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground did not assure success for

36

Bredt and Dodek, supra, note 9; Martin, supra, note 11; Hogg, supra, note 10.
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at para. 69, [1997]
S.C.J. No. 26; Law, supra, note 3, at para. 110; Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, at para. 81, [1999] S.C.J. No. 31.
37

118

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)

equality claimants during the Andrews decade or the first five years under
Law.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE FOUR
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS IN LAW
In the Law case, Iacobucci J. articulated four “contextual factors” to
serve as guides to the determination of whether or not differential treatment on a prohibited ground of discrimination would constitute discrimination in a substantive sense by implicating the claimant’s human
dignity. The four factors, expressed in terms that lean towards a finding
of discrimination, are: (1) the presence of historic disadvantage; (2) the
lack of correspondence between the ground of discrimination at issue
and the actual needs, capacities and circumstances of the claimant; (3)
the absence of a purpose or effect that ameliorates the condition of another more disadvantaged group; and (4) the importance of the interest
interfered with by the state.38 The Court stated that these factors are not
an exhaustive description of the relevant considerations, but it has not
since articulated any others.
One of the difficulties of applying the Law test is that, apart from
indicating that the first factor, historical disadvantage, is the “most compelling”39 indicator of discrimination, the Court did not discuss the relative weight to be given to each factor. This is not a problem when all
factors point towards the same conclusion, which is one of the reasons
why all 15 judges who have heard the recent Charter challenges to the
opposite-sex requirement of the legal definition of marriage have found
that it discriminates against same-sex couples.40 The Law factors work
38

The Court’s description of the four contextual factors is set out in Law, supra, note 3,
at paras. 62-75.
39
Id., at para. 63.
40
Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529, [2003] O.J. No.
2268 (C.A.), affirming the finding that the definition of marriage violates s. 15 reached by the
Divisional Court (2002), 215 D.L.R. (4th) 223, [2003] O.J. No. 2714 (Div. Ct.); EGALE
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (2003) 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (B.C.C.A.), overturning judgment of Pitfield J. finding the definition of marriage violated s. 15 but could be
upheld pursuant to s. 1 (2001), 88 C.R.R. (2d) 322, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1995 (S.C.); Ligue
catholique pour les droits de l’homme c. Hendricks, [2004] Q.J. No. 2593 (Que. C.A.),
affirming the judgment of Lemelin J., Hendricks c. Quebec (Procureur general), [2002] Q.J.
No. 3816 (Que. S.C.).
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well when a government law or policy clearly violates both formal and
substantive conceptions of equality. The legal bar to same-sex marriage
has the effect of further subordinating a disadvantaged group by denying
them entry into one of society’s fundamental legal institutions. Moreover, the legal bar to same-sex marriage is not designed to improve the
conditions of some other disadvantaged group. For these reasons, the
legal definition of marriage contributes to substantive inequality. But the
legal bar also violates formal equality, because the grounds of sex and
sexual orientation do not correspond to any of the objectives of the
contemporary legal regulation of marriage. Now that marital rights and
obligations are framed in gender-neutral terms, and the law no longer
inhibits people’s freedom to choose whether or not to procreate, within
or outside of marriage, the argument that the sex or sexual orientation of
persons seeking to legally marry is somehow relevant to state objectives
founders on irrationality.
The four contextual factors operated effectively and harmoniously
to expose the weakness of the government’s position on the marriage
issue. But what happens when the factors point in different directions?
The combination of the first, third and fourth factors should serve to
maintain a focus on substantive equality: they examine whether the state
has imposed further burdens on already disadvantaged groups, and, if
so, whether those burdens are a result of a targeted program that ameliorates the condition of an equally or more disadvantaged group.41
The second factor, on the other hand, while it is framed in terms of
“correspondence” between the grounds at issue and the claimant’s actual
situation, replicates the “relevance” or “similarly situated” tests that
earlier judgments of the Court rejected as an insufficient guide to the
interpretation of section 15.42 The correspondence factor inevitably
41
In Lovelace v. Canada, supra, note 8, the Court relied on the ameliorative purpose
factor to affirm the principle that the state does not discriminate by adopting targeted ameliorative programs for disadvantaged groups, even if those groups are identified by prohibited
grounds of discrimination. The Court also struggled to explain how the correspondence factor
— or the formal equality, similarly situated test — was not violated by the program. This was
unconvincing. In our view, it would have been more convincing to acknowledge that the
program violated formal equality (because the distinction between band and non-band Aboriginal groups was a poor marker of economic need), and rest the decision upholding the
program on the grounds that the promotion of substantive equality through targeted ameliorative programs can justify violations of formal equality.
42
See Andrews, supra, note 1, at 168; Miron, supra, note 13, at 488, per McLachlin J.;
Egan, supra, note 13, at 546-48, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.
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involves a consideration of the objective of the challenged law or policy,
and a consideration of whether the differential treatment on a prohibited
ground is relevant to the achievement of that objective. In other words,
the correspondence test asks whether the claimant is similarly situated to
those receiving different treatment, measured by reference to differences
that are relevant to the state’s objectives. Whether we label this approach “correspondence”, “relevance” or “means/ends fit”, they are all
variations on the familiar Aristotelian ideal of formal equality: it is not
discriminatory to treat likes alike, and unalikes unalike. Since we are all
alike in some ways, and unalike in others, the question boils down to:
which differences are relevant in this context? Does the differential
treatment at issue correspond to relevant differences in people’s actual
situations? The correspondence factor is the similarly situated test. Both
are inquiries into whether the differential treatment is imposed on the
basis of a characteristic that is relevant to the objectives of the law or
policy at issue.
The four Law factors can thus be seen as an attempt to mediate between formal equality (or rational treatment of individuals) and a substantive conception of equality aimed at ameliorating the conditions of
disadvantaged groups. Much of the time we do not need to choose between them because formal and substantive conceptions of equality do
not always conflict. When a substantive equality analysis and a formal
equality analysis point in the same direction, the result of a court’s consideration of the four contextual factors in Law is straightforward. This
will be true, for example, when the challenged state action is rational
and does not subordinate disadvantaged groups. It will also be true when
the state imposes subordinating and irrational differential treatment on a
disadvantaged group. But when formal and substantive equality point in
different directions, how is a court to weigh the competing factors in
deciding whether the claimant has established discrimination in a substantive sense? As we discussed in Part I above, the Court has not yet
fully resolved this issue. When the state violates formal equality and
promotes substantive equality by adopting targeted ameliorative programs, section 15 is not violated: substantive equality trumps formal
inequality. But when subordinating effects on disadvantaged groups
result from the rational pursuit of a state objective, the Court’s recent
decisions suggest that formal equality trumps substantive inequality.
The following chart lists the Court’s determinations on each of the four
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contextual factors in the fifteen rulings that involved some discussion of
this stage of the Law analysis.43
1. The Four Contextual Factors at Work in SCC Equality Rights
Rulings
Case
1. Law44
2. M. v. H.45
3. Corbiere46
4. Winko47
5. Delisle48
6. Lovelace49
7. Granovsky50
8. Little Sisters51
9. Lavoie plurality52
10. Gosselin53
11. Walsh54
12. Siemens55
13. Trociuk56
14. Martin57

Historical
Disadvantage?

Lack of
Correspondence?

x
➼
➼
➼
➼
x
➼
➼
x
x
neutral

x
➼
➼
x
x
x
x
➼
➼
x
x
x
➼
➼

Lack of
Ameliorative
Purpose?
x
➼
x
x
➼
neutral
x
➼

Important
Interest
Violated?
➼
➼
neutral
neutral
➼
➼
x
➼
➼

Disc’n?

No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

43
Omitted from the chart is R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, the one post-Law case in which a s. 15 claim was disposed of entirely at
the first (differential treatment) or second (prohibited ground) stages of the s. 15 analysis. In
Malmo-Levine the claim that the marihuana possession offence violated s. 15 was dismissed
at the prohibited grounds stage. “Pot smoking” was not analogous to other prohibited
grounds. To hold otherwise, Gonthier and Binnie JJ. wrote, at para. 185, “would simply be to
create a parody of a noble purpose”.
44
Law, supra, note 3.
45
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23.
46
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 24.
47
Winko, supra, note 37.
48
Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, [1999] S.C.J. No. 43.
49
Supra, note 41.
50
Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R.
703, [2000] S.C.J. No. 29.
51
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2
S.C.R. 1120, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66.
52
Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24.
53
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85.
54
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84.
55
Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6, [2002] S.C.J. No. 69.
56
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32.
57
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003]
S.C.J. No. 54.
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➼

➼

No

the Court found this factor leaned against a finding of
discrimination
the Court found this factor leaned toward a finding of discrimination
the Court found this factor did not lean in either direction
this factor was not addressed

The pattern of results in these Supreme Court cases applying the
Law test makes clear that the correspondence factor has thus far
proven to be the most important factor in determining whether or not
the Court finds a difference in treatment on a prohibited ground to be
discriminatory. Historical disadvantage, far from being the “most
compelling” factor as Iacobucci J. suggested it should be in Law,59 has
played a secondary role. The Court’s finding on historical disadvantage has supported the outcome of the discrimination inquiry in only
seven of the 15 cases. The record of the third and fourth factors is
similar: the findings on ameliorative purpose and the importance of the
interest at stake have supported the outcome of the discrimination
inquiry in six of 15 and eight of 15 cases respectively. The finding on
the correspondence factor, on the other hand, has aligned with the
outcome of the discrimination inquiry in all 15 cases. In short, it seems
that the finding on the correspondence factor and the conclusion on
discrimination invariably correspond.
The dominance of correspondence, or formal equality, in the
Court’s recent rulings occurs in a number of different ways. A violation
of formal equality may be sufficient to establish that differential treatment on a prohibited ground is discriminatory. An example is the
Court’s decision last year in Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney
General).60 In that case, a father challenged a provision of the Vital
Statistics Act61 that permitted a mother to exclude a father from having
58
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
76, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6.
59
Law, supra, note 3, at para. 63.
60
Supra, note 56.
61
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479.
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his particulars included in their child’s birth registration and from participating in choosing the child’s surname. While Deschamps J.’s opinion on behalf of the Court did not address the correspondence factor by
name, the gist of her reasoning was that the prohibited ground at issue,
sex, did not always correspond to good reasons for excluding fathers
from the birth registration and naming process. The arbitrariness of the
exclusion drove Deschamps J. to the conclusion that the difference in
treatment was discriminatory, notwithstanding that the claimant, or
fathers generally, could not be said to be members of a historically disadvantaged group.
The overriding importance accorded to the correspondence factor
was also apparent in the other successful section 15 claim in last year’s
Supreme Court decisions, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board)
v. Martin.62 In finding that the exclusion of chronic pain claimants from
workers’ compensation benefits and services amounted to discrimination on the basis of physical disability, Gonthier J. commented that the
lack of correspondence between the differential treatment and the true
needs and circumstances of the claimants was “at the heart of the section
15(1) claim”.63 Since the lack of correspondence was the “gravamen of
the appellants’ section 15 claim”,64 a consideration of relative historic
disadvantage was “largely inappropriate”.65
Finding irrational differences in treatment on the basis of prohibited
grounds — that is, violations of formal equality — to be sufficient to
lead to a finding of discrimination, as occurred in Trociuk and Martin, is
not always troubling. Formal equality is not necessarily inconsistent
with substantive equality, and of course formal inequality may be the
means (as in Martin) through which substantive inequality is perpetuated. The main concern with the Court’s analysis in cases like Trociuk
and Martin is that by foregrounding formal inequality, the Court may
put aside its stated commitment to treating the achievement of substantive equality as section 15’s ultimate purpose.66

62

Supra, note 57.
Id., at para. 89.
64
Id., at para. 91.
65
Id., at para. 89.
66
For an argument that this is precisely what happened in Trociuk, supra, note 56, see
H. Lessard, “Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality Framework and
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)” (2004) C.J.W.L. (forthcoming).
63
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Another, and more troubling, way in which formal equality is dominating the Court’s equality jurisprudence is that in some cases a lack of
correspondence is being found to be a necessary ingredient of a finding
of discrimination. Thus, in a handful of cases, the Court’s finding that
the ground of discrimination corresponded to actual circumstances that
were relevant to the law was the sole basis for concluding that discrimination had not been demonstrated.67 Perhaps the starkest example of this
trend is the recent decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth
and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General)68 in which a majority of the
Court rejected the argument that section 43 of the Criminal Code discriminated on the basis of age by exempting parents, guardians and
teachers from prosecution for assault when they use reasonable force to
correct children in their care. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf
of the 6-3 majority that upheld the legislation, concluded in one short
paragraph that three of the contextual factors leaned toward a finding of
discrimination:
The first Law factor, vulnerability and pre-existing disadvantage, is clearly
met in this case. Children are a highly vulnerable group. Similarly, the
fourth factor is met. The nature of the interest affected — physical
integrity — is profound. No one contends that s. 43 is designed to
ameliorate the condition of another more disadvantaged group: the third
factor.69

Nevertheless, the Chief Justice went on to conclude that the subordinating differential treatment was not discriminatory in a substantive sense.
Her conclusion in this regard turned entirely on the correspondence
factor: age, she held, corresponds to the need to use corrective and reasonable force in some circumstances.
The result of permitting the correspondence factor to trump the
other three factors is that even differential treatment on a prohibited
ground that further subordinates a disadvantaged group will not be
found to violate section 15 if the claimant fails to demonstrate that the
law or policy at issue lacks a rational basis. The state is not called upon
to justify its imposition of subordinating differential treatment on disad67
Winko, supra, note 37; Delisle, supra, note 48; Walsh, supra, note 54; Siemens, supra, note 55.
68
Supra, note 58.
69
Id., at para. 56.
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vantaged groups. Rather, the claimant has the burden of proving the lack
of a rational connection between the personal characteristic at issue and
the objective of the challenged law. The problem with this approach is
that it too readily forgives the exacerbation of substantive inequality.

V. REVISITING THE LAW TEST
Our review of Supreme Court of Canada and lower court rulings on
section 15 claims since the 1989 decision in Andrews reveals that, far
from being captured by equality-seeking groups, the courts have approached section 15 cautiously from the outset. Many section 15 rulings
reflect a persistent anxiety about the breadth and depth of its potential
impact on state policies involving the distribution of material resources.
Section 15 claims have consistently received a less receptive audience in
the courts than is the norm for Charter claims generally. This was true in
the decade during which Andrews was the leading section 15 case, and
has remained true in the five years since the Law test displaced Andrews
as the template for the adjudication of equality rights claims. Perhaps
surprisingly, in light of the apparent additional burdens placed on section 15 claimants by the human dignity analysis in Law, the success rate
of section 15 claims in the past five years has been higher, at both the
Supreme Court and in the lower courts, than it was in the Andrews decade. This may be explained in large part by a deepening appreciation on
the part of potential claimants and their lawyers of the nature of the
hurdles section 15 claims must surmount and thus a declining propensity
to launch relatively high-risk challenges. But it may also suggest that the
critics of the Law ruling should be wary of exaggerating the positive
aspects of the Andrews test and the manner of its application up until
1999. Equality claimants have faced long odds and significant jurisprudential obstacles to successful Charter challenges throughout the past 15
years. This is so even though equality-seeking groups have succeeded in
establishing many of the key elements of a substantive conception of
equality.70 Putting substantive equality to work to achieve favourable
litigation outcomes appears to be another matter entirely.

70

regard.

See Manfredi, supra, note 33, chapter 2, for an account of LEAF’s successes in this
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Section 15 of the Charter has had considerable influence in the
courts and in governments “as an authoritative normative statement
about fundamental values of equality”.71 The Court is comfortable giving weight to equality values when interpreting legal rights,72 or the
right to vote (as in the Figueroa73 ruling last year), or when considering
whether limits on rights or freedoms can be upheld under section 1.74
While equality values have exerted an important influence on Charter
interpretation and the design and administration of government policies,75 the results of Supreme Court section 15 cases have had, with a
few exceptions, a modest impact on government policies and, for the
most part, have been disappointing from the point of view of equalityseeking groups. Why is the court so apparently comfortable with equality values but so cautious about equality rights? A large part of the answer probably lies in the potential breadth of section 15’s impact on
complex areas of redistributive social policy. The Court is manifestly
uncomfortable with equality rights claims that directly target the ways in
which governments raise and distribute material resources in areas such
as income tax, pension or social assistance policy. These kinds of challenges often face a steeper than usual uphill battle, and the quality of the
Court’s reasoning often suffers. The Symes,76 Thibaudeau77 and
Gosselin78 rulings are cases in point.
The successful section 15 claims establishing a right to marry for
same-sex couples in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec demonstrate
the power of the Law analysis when formal and substantive equality
analyses coincide and what is at stake, primarily, is the state’s distribu-

71
L. Smith, “Have the Equality Rights Made Any Difference?”, in P. Bryden, S.
Davis and J. Russell eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place
in Canada’s Political, Legal and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1994) p. 60, at p. 72.
72
An example is the weight given to sex equality in upholding sexual assault legislation alleged to violate the rights of accused persons. See the discussion in Manfredi, supra,
note 33, chapter 5.
73
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37.
74
P.W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation”, Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé International Conference, Québec City, (21 March 2003).
75
See Hiebert, supra, note 33.
76
Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131.
77
Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42.
78
Supra, note 53.
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tion of symbolic as opposed to material resources.79 Despite this compelling example of the power of the Law analysis to displace state policies resting on deeply rooted, irrational and subordinating prejudices,
our examination of the Court’s recent section 15 decisions reveals a
danger that the Law test can readily serve to forgive state policies that
impose subordinating differential treatment on disadvantaged groups so
long as those policies have a rational basis.
To reduce this danger, the Court needs to adopt a test for the justification of subordinating treatment of disadvantaged groups that demands
more from government. Rather than forgive such treatment whenever
there is a relevant connection between the differential subordinating
treatment on a prohibited ground and a state objective, the government
should be held to a higher standard. Governments should have to demonstrate not only that they have chosen rational means for the pursuit of
compelling objectives, but also that they had no other options that would
have had a less burdensome impact on disadvantaged groups. This
higher standard could be adopted by treating the demonstration of subordinating differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground as
sufficient to establish a violation of section 15. A consideration of the
relevance of the prohibited ground to state objectives, or the test of
means/ends fit, could be left in such cases to the section 1 stage of
analysis as several commentators have recommended.80 South African
equality jurisprudence treats the lack of a rational basis as sufficient but
not necessary to establish a violation of equality. In other words, the
presence of a rational basis, or a correspondence between the prohibited
grounds and state objectives, is not sufficient to establish a lack of discrimination.81 South African judges have fashioned an equality jurisprudence that borrows heavily from the ideas of Supreme Court of Canada

79
Judy Fudge has argued, drawing on Nancy Fraser’s distinction between recognition
claims and redistributive claims, that Charter equality rights foster recognition claims and
recognition remedies but are “not very amenable to claims that either challenge pervasive
social and legal norms or involve redistribution”. J. Fudge, “The Canadian Charter of Rights:
Recognition, Redistribution, and the Imperialism of the Courts”, in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing
and A. Tomkins eds., Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001) 336, at 343.
80
See Greschner, supra, note 12; Martin, supra, note 11; Hogg, supra, note 10.
81
See the test set out in Harksen v. Lane NO and Others (1997) 11 B.C.L.R. 1489
(CC).
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judges, particularly those of L’Heureux-Dubé J.82 Perhaps it is time to
borrow back. The Court needs to reconsider the incisive critiques presented by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Egan83 and by McLachlin J. (as she
then was) in Miron84 of treating proof of irrelevance as a necessary
component of a section 15 violation.
Another way of accomplishing the same result would be to build a
more demanding test for means/ends fit into the section 15 analysis, in a
manner that would ease the current evidentiary burdens on claimants
and demand more of the state than the presence of a rational basis. This
might involve modifying the Law test in some respects, and in other
respects it might involve a renewed emphasis on passages in Iacobucci
J.’s opinion in Law that have been overshadowed by subsequent developments. The Court’s recent jurisprudence treats the correspondence
factor, which has proven to be a similarly situated or relevance test
dressed up in new linguistic garb, as the decisive factor in equality
claims. The Court could reiterate that the presence of historical disadvantage is “the most compelling factor favouring a conclusion that differential treatment imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory”.85 The
Court could also explore Iacobucci J.’s suggestion in Law that “a more
precise correspondence will likely be important where the individual or
group which is excluded by the legislation is already disadvantaged or
vulnerable within Canadian society”.86 A more demanding test of
means/ends fit would be one that asked the state to demonstrate that it
chose the least subordinating means of pursuing a compelling objective
that is itself consistent with equality norms.
If the Law test were revised along these lines, a more sensible division of the burden of proof in section 15 cases would result. In cases
where the claimant has established subordinating differential treatment
of a disadvantaged individual or group, the government could avoid a
82

For overviews of the South African constitutional equality jurisprudence, see S. Jagwanth and C. Murray, “Ten Years of Transformation: How Has Gender Equality in South
Africa Fared?” (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 255; A. Sachs, “Equality Jurisprudence: The Origin of
Doctrine in the South African Constitutional Court” (1999) 5 Review of Constitutional
Studies 76; S. Cowen, “Can ‘Dignity’ Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?” (2001)
17 South African J. Human Rights 34.
83
Supra, note 13.
84
Id.
85
Law, supra, note 3, at para. 63.
86
Id., at para. 106.
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finding that section 15 is violated in one of two ways. First, it could
show that the differential treatment was a result of a carefully targeted
program aimed at ameliorating the conditions of a more or equally disadvantaged group. Second, it could displace a presumption of discrimination where subordinating treatment of disadvantaged individuals or
groups has been established by showing that it was pursuing a compelling objective pursuant to the least subordinating means. In other words,
the government, not the claimant, would have to demonstrate the nature
and importance of its objective, and the government, not the claimant,
would have to show that it considered alternative means but none promised a less burdensome impact on the claimant or the disadvantaged
group s/he represents.
It may be true, as Iacobucci J. stated in Law, that there should be
“no principle or evidentiary presumption that differential treatment for
historically disadvantaged persons is discriminatory”.87 However, such a
presumption is appropriate if the differential treatment at issue further
subordinates a disadvantaged individual or group by imposing a burden
or denying a benefit, and the policy at issue is not a targeted program
that ameliorates the condition of a more or equally disadvantaged group.
Without taking some steps along these lines, the Court’s stated commitment to substantive equality is at risk of receding even further from
its jurisprudential grasp.

87

Id., at para. 67.
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VI. APPENDIX A
Summary of Supreme Court of Canada Dispositions of Section 15
Claims
Listed below are all Supreme Court of Canada cases where a section
15 claim was addressed by a majority of the Court. Companion cases
that involved challenges to the same or similar legal provisions and
raised the same section 15 issues have been grouped together and
counted as one case.
Key
Ground = ground of discrimination asserted
Section 15 violated? = whether a majority or plurality found a violation
of section 15, and, if not, at which stage of the section 15 analysis the
claim failed (1st = because no difference in treatment found; 2nd =
because the difference in treatment was found not to be on the basis of a
prohibited ground; 3rd = because the difference in treatment on a prohibited ground was found not to be discrimination in a substantive
sense; other = section 15 held to be inapplicable).
Section 1 limit? = whether violation of section 15 upheld pursuant to
section 1.
Result = whether an unjustifiable violation of section 15 found.
Case

Ground

Section 15 violated?

Section 1 limit?

Result

1. Andrews
(1989)88

Citizenship

Yes

No

Yes

2. Workers’
Comp. Ref.
(1989)89

Employment
status

No (2nd)

N/A

No

3. Turpin
(1989)90

Province of
residence

No (2nd)

N/A

No

88
89
90

Supra, note 1.
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 922.
Supra, note 6.
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4. R. v. S. (S.)
(1990)91
R. v. S. (G.)
(1990)92
R. v. P. (J.)
(1990)93
R. v. T. (A.)
(1990)94
R. v. B. (J.)
(1990)95

Province of
residence

No (3rd)

N/A

No

5. R. v. Hess
(1990)96

Sex

No (3rd)

N/A

No

6. McKinney
(1990)97
Harrison
(1990)98
Stoffman
(1990)99

Age

Yes

Yes

No

7. Rudolph
Wolff (1990)100
Dywidag
(1990)101

Group seeking
relief from the
federal crown

No (2nd)

N/A

No

8. TétreaultGadoury
(1991)102

Age

Yes

No

Yes

9. R v.
Généreux
(1992)103

Employment
status

No (2nd)

N/A

No

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

123.

99

[1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, [1990] S.C.J. No. 66.
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 294, [1990] S.C.J. No. 68.
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 300, [1990] S.C.J. No. 67.
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 304, [1990] S.C.J. No. 69.
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 307, [1990] S.C.J. No. 70.
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91.
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122.
Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451, [1990] S.C.J. No.

Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, [1990] S.C.J. No. 125.
Rudolph Wolff & Co. v. Canada, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695, [1990] S.C.J. No. 28.
101
Dywidag Systems International, Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers Construction Ltd.,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 705, [1990] S.C.J. No. 27.
102
Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 22, [1991] S.C.J. No. 41.
103
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, [1992] S.C.J. No. 10.
100
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10. Schachter
(1992)104

Family status

Yes

No

Yes

11. Chiarelli
(1992)105

Permanent
residents

No (other)

N/A

No

12. Rodriguez
(1993)106

Physical
disability

Not decided

Yes

No

13. Symes
(1993)107

Sex

No (1st)

N/A

No

14. Weatherall
(1993)108

Sex

No (3rd)

Even if did, yes
justified

No

15. Haig
(1993)109

Province of
residence

No (2nd)

N/A

No

16. NWAC
(1994)110

Sex

No (other)

N/A

No

17. Finta
(1994)111

Group of persons
who commit war
crimes/or crimes
against humanity

No (2nd)

N/A

No

18. Miron
(1995)112

Marital status

Yes

No

Yes

19. Egan
(1995)113

Sexual
orientation

Yes

Yes

No

20. Thibaudeau
(1995)114

Family status &
sex

No (1st)

N/A

No

104

Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R.
711, [1992] S.C.J. No. 27.
106
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 94.
107
Supra, note 76.
108
Supra, note 31.
109
Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, [1993] S.C.J. No. 84.
110
Native Women’s Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994], 3 S.C.R. 627, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 93.
111
R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26.
112
Supra, note 13.
113
Supra, note 13.
105
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21. Ont. Home
Bldr’s Assoc.
(1996)115

Religion

No (other)

N/A

No

22. Adler
(1996)116

Religion

No (other)

N/A

No

23. Eaton
(1997)117

Physical
disability

No (3rd)

N/A

No

24. Benner
(1997)118

Sex

Yes

No

Yes

25. Eldridge
(1997)119

Physical
disability

Yes

No

Yes

26. Vriend
(1998)120

Sexual
orientation

Yes

No

Yes

27. Van.
Society of Imm.
& V.M.
Women
(1999)121

Immigrant status,
race, sex, national or ethnic
origin

No (1st)

N/A

No

28. Law
(1999)122

Age

No (3rd)

N/A

No

29. M. v. H.
(1999)123

Sexual
orientation

Yes

No

Yes

30. Corbière
(1999)124

Aboriginalityresidence

Yes

No

Yes

114

Supra, note 77.
Ontario Home Builders’ Association v. York Region Board of Education, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 929, [1996] S.C.J. No. 80.
116
Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110.
117
Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education,, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, [1997] S.C.J. No. 98.
118
Supra, note 37.
119
Supra, note 7.
120
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29.
121
Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R., [1999] 1
S.C.R. 10, [1999] S.C.J. No. 5.
122
Supra, note 3.
123
Supra, note 45.
124
Supra, note 46.
115

134
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31. Winko
(1999)125
Orlowski
(1999)126
Bese (1999)127
Lepage
(1999)128

Mental disability

No (3rd)

N/A

No

32. Delisle
(1999)129

Employment
status

No (2nd & 3rd)

N/A

No

33. Lovelace
(2000)130

Non-band
aboriginality (not
decided)

No (3rd)

N/A

No

34. Granovsky
(2000)131

Physical
disability

No (3rd)

N/A

No

35. Little
Sisters
(2000)132

Sexual
orientation

Yes

No

Yes

36. Lavoie
(2002)133

Citizenship

Yes

Yes

No

37. Gosselin
(2002)134

Age

No (3rd)

N/A

No

38. Nova Scotia
v. Walsh
(2002)135

Marital status

No (3rd)

N/A

No

39. Siemens v.
Manitoba
(2003)136

Place of residence

No (2nd)

N/A

No

125

Supra, note 37.
Orlowski v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 733,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 33.
127
Bese v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 722,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 32.
128
R. v. Lepage, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 744, [1999] S.C.J. No. 34.
129
Supra, note 48.
130
Supra, note 8.
131
Supra, note 50.
132
Supra, note 51.
133
Supra, note 52.
134
Supra, note 53.
135
Supra, note 54.
136
Supra, note 55.
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40. Trociuk v.
B.C. (2003)137

Sex

Yes

No

Yes

41. Nova Scotia
(WCB) v.
Martin
(2003)138

Physical Disability

Yes

No

Yes

42. R. v.
Malmo-Levine
(2003)139

Marijuana use

No (2nd)

N/A

No

43. Canadian
Foundation for
Children, Youth
and the Law v.
Canada
(2004)140

Age

No (3rd)

N/A

No

137
138
139
140

Supra, note 56.
Supra, note 57.
Supra, note 43.
Supra, note 58.
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VII. APPENDIX B
Annual Success Rate in SCC Section 15 Cases
Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total

Number of Cases
3
4
1
3
4
2
3
2
3
1
6
3
0
3
4
1
43

Number of Wins
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
2
1
2
1
0
0
2
0
12

Success Rate
33.3%
0%
100%
33.3%
0%
0%
33.3%
0%
66.6%
100%
33.3%
33.3%
0%
50%
0%
27.9%

